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THE SECONDARY MARKET FOR TICKETS:
A LOOK AT TICKET SCALPING THROUGH AN




The word "scalper"' tends to conjure up negative connotations.
Average sporting event patrons are likely to be suspicious of the
seemingly shady figures lurking around the stadiums and arenas of
their favorite teams. Despite society's general scornful attitude to-
wards the activity and legislative attempts at prohibition, the practice
of ticket scalping continues to thrive. This is evidenced by the fact
that those seemingly shady figures, just as always, are still engaging in
the activity.
A plausible explanation for the continued existence of this secon-
dary market might be found by reasoning that the scalper has some-
thing that the public wants, and the public likewise has something that
the scalper wants. This mutually beneficial exchange between two en-
tities demonstrates the prototypical market situation. By pursuing
their own self-interest, both sides of the exchange advance not only
their own welfare, but the welfare of society as well. Under this rea-
soning, the continued existence of the practice of ticket scalping seems
to validate the classic economic theory of the invisible hand. 2
That being said, the secondary market for tickets also presents
many controversial issues. The aforementioned mutually beneficial
exchange brings along with it several questions of economic fairness,
property law, and constitutional interpretation. Part II of this article
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D. expected 2011.
1. "Scalpers" resell tickets to sporting and entertainment events at a price that is above face
value in order to make a profit.
2. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS
351-2 (J.C. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776) (arguing that "[bly preferring the sup-
port of domestic to that of foreign industry, [the individual] intends only his own security; and by
directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends
only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an INVISIBLE HAND to promote
an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no
part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectu-
ally than when he really intends to promote it.").
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will explore the positive and negative economic effects of the secon-
dary market. Part III will attempt to illustrate how ticket scalping falls
into the principles of property law. Part IV will examine judicial re-
view of legislatures' anti-scalping laws through a constitutional lens.
Finally, Part V will examine several regulatory approaches through
the economic, property, and constitutional framework in an attempt
to find which approach is the most satisfactory.
II. ECONOMIC ISSUES
In the Western world, it is for the most part undisputed that any
sound economic policy should attempt to allocate resources in a way
that will maximize social utility. Therefore, from an economic per-
spective the best policy regarding ticket scalping should maximize so-
cietal welfare.3 When dealing with any policy, it is important to
examine it from an economic perspective in order to promote effi-
ciency. 4 This section will explain the structure of the secondary mar-
ket for tickets and show both its positive and its negative economic
effects.
A. Structure of the Ticket Market
Tickets to sporting and entertainment events are consumer goods.
Forces of supply and demand interact through a price mechanism in
order to influence producers and consumers. In a competitive indus-
try in which the goods are homogenous, firms will compete by lower-
ing the price until it is at the social utility-maximizing equilibrium so
that quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. However, in an in-
dustry in which the goods are differentiable, each firm will theoreti-
cally be able to exercise some monopoly power.
Tickets to major sporting events more closely resemble an industry
with differentiable goods. Attending a game or event gives the con-
3. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs, A MODERN APPROACH 14-8 (7th
ed. 2006).
4. Here we are concerned for the most part with Pareto efficiency. Pareto efficiency is a
useful criterion for comparing the outcomes of different economic institutions, and it is defined
by the following:
[I]f we can find a way to make some people better off without making anybody else
worse off, we have a Pareto improvement. If an allocation allows for a Pareto improve-
ment, it is called Pareto inefficient; if an allocation is such that no Pareto improvements
are possible, it is called Pareto efficient. A Pareto inefficient allocation has the undesir-
able feature that there is some way to make somebody better off without hurting any-
one else. There may be other positive things about the allocation, but the fact that it is
Pareto inefficient is certainly one strike against it. If there is a way to make someone
better off without hurting anyone else, why not do it?
Id. at 15-7.
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sumer a unique experience,5 especially since consumers will usually be
fans of a particular team and desire to see a particular event. Al-
though most major events will be televised, watching a game on televi-
sion does not give the consumer the same experience as actually being
there among the crowds and excitement. This differentiability means
that consumer demand should be particularized so that the ticket sup-
plier faces little direct competition.
Due to space constraints, there is a limited supply of tickets that
may be sold to a given sporting event. The supplier of tickets may
only sell as many tickets as he may fit within the arena, stadium, or
other venue in which the event takes place. In a perfect market situa-
tion, the revenue-maximizing ticket supplier would charge the highest
possible price for the tickets so that there would be exactly as many
people willing and able to buy the tickets as the supplier could fit
within the venue.
Taken together, the limited supply and the differentiability of the
market should give ticket suppliers monopoly power. With no com-
petitive pressure to lower prices, the profit-maximizing ticket supplier
should theoretically sell tickets at the highest price that the market
can stand. This would create a situation in which there would be no
excess demand, even for a popular event, because the venue would be
entirely filled by those consumers who would be willing to pay the
high price of admission. Supply would exactly equal demand, creating
a situation economists refer to as "market-clearing." 6
In the real world, however, ticket suppliers regularly sell tickets at a
price lower than that which would clear the market.7 Although it is
possible that the explanation for charging this low price could be noth-
ing more than poor market analysis on the part of the ticket suppli-
ers,8 a more likely explanation is that consistent sellouts are desirable
enough to prevent ticket suppliers from charging a market-clearing
price. 9 Moreover, keeping the prices low so that "blue collar fans"
can afford to purchase tickets will help the organizations satisfy their
long-term agenda of maintaining a sustainable fan-base.10 Regardless
5. John D. Tishler, Ticket Scalping: An Economic Analysis and Proposed Solution, 33 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 91, 96 (1993).
6. See ROGER LEROY MILLER, ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC ISSUES 215 (Addison-
Wesley 2003).
7. See Stephen K. Happel & Marianne M. Jennings, Assessing the Economic Rationale and
Legal Remedies for Ticket Scalping, 16 J. LEGis. 1, 7 (1989).
8. Id. at 7-8.
9. Gary Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of Social Influences on
Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1109 (1991).
10. Happel & Jennings, supra at 8-9.
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of why ticket suppliers behave this way, the low prices create a situa-
tion in which there are more people willing and able to purchase tick-
ets than there are available seats. This situation is called excess
demand.
Excess demand helps create the secondary market of ticket scalp-
ing. Ticket scalping is a consumer service that exists in order to clear
the secondary market that is created by the excess demand. When a
promoter charges less than the market clearing price for tickets, de-
mand for those tickets will exceed their supply, and some mechanism
other than price must determine which consumers get to purchase the
tickets." One of these mechanisms is a queue. 12 Queuing substan-
tially transforms the cost of a ticket.13 The true cost becomes the
money price plus the time price of waiting in line.14 Therefore, for
people who do not have time or are simply unwilling to stand in line
to purchase tickets, the cost of buying a ticket from the queue is very
high. These people might be more willing to buy tickets from the sec-
ondary market at an increased price in order to avoid the lines. The
true price of a ticket is not only the cost of the ticket itself, but also the
opportunity cost of attaining it; therefore, scalpers hire people to
stand in line and purchase tickets which are turned over and resold by
the scalper at a higher price.' 5
B. Positive Economic Effects
Despite the negative stigma of scalping, the positive economic ef-
fects of the secondary market are at least one partial explanation for
its continued existence. Several of these positive economic effects are
the possibility of a lower price in the secondary market, the ability of
the market to clear, and the increased convenience that comes along
with the coexistence of technology and the secondary market.
1. The Possibility of a Lower Price in the Secondary Market
Allowing the secondary market to thrive allows for situations in
which a patron could purchase tickets at prices that are lower than
face value. Although scalping is defined as the business of obtaining
tickets to sporting events, amusements or exhibitions then reselling
them at a higher price,16 consumers will benefit when the price of tick-
11. Tishler, supra note 5, at 103.
12. Queue is the British word for a waiting line.
13. Tishler, supra note 5, at 103
14. Tishler, supra note 5, at 103
15. Id. at 105
16. 27A Am. Jur. 2d Entertainment and Sports Law § 7 (2009).
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ets in the secondary market is lower than face value. Reselling tickets
at a lower price is not banned by most anti-scalping ordinances,1 7 but
this type of activity is only likely to arise in an environment where a
secondary market exists in the first place. A resale price below face
value usually results when the scalper overestimates the demand for
the event. Consequently, he must resell at a lower price to recoup his
loss. This produces a positive result because the consumers are able
to attend the event at a low price. Furthermore, scalpers are en-
couraged to thoroughly analyze market demand in order to set effi-
cient prices and avoid losses, thereby maximizing societal benefits
from market conduct.
2. Market Clearing
As mentioned above, economists generally look at queues nega-
tively because they indicate that the market is not clearing due to ex-
cess demand. The existence of a secondary market allows the market
to clear when the ticket suppliers in the primary market set prices
artificially low.
Market clearing also allows tickets to be distributed in a way that
maximizes society's well-being. In the absence of transaction costs,
ticket-holders could trade until the tickets would be allocated in the
hands of the people who would value them the most. However, many
mutually beneficial exchanges would fail to occur if each willing buyer
had to find a willing seller. The ticket scalper facilitates the transfer
from the low-valuing consumer to the high-valuing consumer and
takes as payment a portion of the surplus created."'
3. Technology
The development of technology has made ticket sales in the secon-
dary market much safer and more convenient.19 Scalping used to be a
shady activity that took place in back alleys,20 but technology has le-
gitimized it to the point where it is a fairly safe industry. 21 Today the
17. See Anthony J. Dreyer & Mitchell P. Schwartz, Whose Game is it Anyway: Sport Teams'
Right to Restrict (and Control) Ticket Resale, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
753 (2007).
18. See Tishler, supra note 5, at 96.
19. See generally Daniel J. Glantz, For-Bid Scalping Online?: Anti-Scalping Legislation in an
Internet Society, 23 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L. J. 261 (2005).
20. See Eric Baker, Ticket Resale Ban Would Hurt Fans, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Feb. 20,
2008 at B5 (arguing against legislation banning ticket resale because the migration of the secon-
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Internet enables an open, transparent and secure marketplace for
tickets, where consumers don't have to risk showing up to the event
and being unable to find tickets to purchase. 22With the advent of In-
ternet auctions, various online secondary marketplaces, sports teams,
and concert promoters are eager to provide websites to let fans sell
tickets they have purchased but are unable to use. 23
C. Negative Economic Effects
Although the positive economic effects of the secondary market are
legitimate, scalping also has several negative economic effects that
fuel anti-scalping sentiments. Negative economic effects include fair-
ness concerns, fraud and corruption, and loss of tax revenues.
1. Fairness Concerns
One of the most prominent arguments made against ticket scalping
is that scalpers charge exorbitant prices that are unfair to true fans
and poor people who want to see an event. 24 Ticket suppliers attempt
to keep prices low to retain goodwill with customers, 25 but scalpers
charge prices significantly above face value and make tickets unaf-
fordable to average fans. Politicians support anti-scalping ordinances
because they are hesitant to open the floodgates and allow anyone to
sell tickets without any limitation on costs. 2 6
Moreover, teams view scalping as unfair because scalpers make ex-
cessive profits of which the teams do not get a cut. The teams are "on
the sidelines" because for years they have watched ticket brokers earn
hundreds of thousands of dollars from an entertainment product that
the teams-not the brokers-create and develop. 27
2. Fraud and Corruption
It has been claimed that fraud and corruption run rampant in the
secondary market.28 One corrupt practice includes ticket brokers pay-
ing illegal and substantial bribes to various persons who have control
22. Id.
23. Glantz, supra note 19, at 262-3.
24. Jonathan C. Benitah, Anti-Scalping Laws: Should They Be Forgotten?, 6 TEX. REV. ENT.
& SPORTS L. 55, 60 (2005).
25. Id.
26. Hillary Chabot, Bill Would Repeal State's Anti-Scalping Law, THE BERKSHIRE EAGLE
(Pittsfield, Mass.), Oct. 3 2007, (quoting Rep. James Eldridge).
27. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 755.
28. See generally Bureau of Investor Protection and Securities, Why Can't I Get Tickets?,
Report on Ticket Distribution Practices 2 (May 27, 1999) (hereafter referred to as "Spitzer
Report").
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over tickets at the original point of sale.2 9 Some people who have
control over tickets at the original point of sale are venue operators,
agents, or employees. Pay-offs made to these persons are known as
"ice." 30
Another corrupt practice includes fraud. Tickets purchased from
scalpers are often suspected to be fraudulent. This argument is sup-
ported by the fact that some sellers in the secondary market have
been caught selling fake tickets.3 ' These concerns cause anxiety in
potential consumers over the secondary market.
3. Loss of Tax Revenues
When tickets are resold at shockingly high prices as part of an "un-
derground economy", politicians are outraged at the lost tax reve-
nue.32 The problem here is that, like any underground economy, if
the government does not know about the activity it cannot be taxed.
Undeclared taxable income received by box office employees and bro-
kers because of the secondary market is a matter requiring increased
attention.33
III. PROPERTY LAW ISSUES
This section will analyze the primary and secondary market for tick-
ets in the context of property law. A thorough examination of the
ticket market must include a property law perspective because this
area of law contains the bulk of the legal analysis, as opposed to eco-
nomic analysis, concerning the legality of the secondary market. Rel-
evant property law topics include the question of licenses or leases
and also concepts of nuisance.
A. Structure of the Ticket Market
The ticket market revolves around a license contract between teams
and patrons. Although these licenses fall within the scope of property
law, the property interest that comes with the ticket is extremely lim-
ited; it only grants the holder the limited right to use and enjoy the
object or land. 3 4 A license grants the licensee a right to enter upon
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Editorial, Man Gets 3 Years in Bears Ticket Scam, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 22, 2008;
Andy Nelesen, Ticket Scalper Gets 8 Months, GREEN BAY GAZETTE, Sept. 19, 2008.
32. See Spitzer Report, supra note 28, at 10
33. Spitzer Report, supra note 28, at 10
34. See Danette R. Davis, The Myth and Mystery of Personal Seat Licenses and Season Tickets:
Licenses or More?, 51 ST. Louis L. J. 241, 245 (2006).
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the licensor's land and use it for a specific purpose, without giving up
the licensor's legal possession and control over the property.35
In its precise legal sense, property is nothing more than a collection
of rights.36 Property as to a thing "does not consist merely in its own-
ership or possession, but also in the lawful, unrestricted right of its
use, enjoyment, and disposal."37 Licenses only pass a limited right of
possession, as opposed to all of these rights. Tickets being mere li-
censes, the team still retains legal possession and control over the seat.
Furthermore, a license is revocable at any time at the will of the licen-
sor, and mere possession to use the land does not ripen into a pre-
scriptive right regardless of the length of time that such enjoyment is
permitted.38
Besides the limited interests a ticket license, a property law analysis
is also important to the secondary ticket market because anti-scalping
sentiments are furthered by principles of nuisance. Governments es-
pecially oppose scalping practices on nuisance grounds.39
B. Traditional Property Law
According to traditional property law, licenses are non-assignable.
The right of possession is limited to the particular licensee, and the
right to alienate is simply not part of a license. The following deci-
sions enforce this traditional doctrine of property law.
1. Soderholm v. Chicago Nat'l League Baseball Club
In Soderholm, the plaintiff purchased season tickets for five years in
a row, but upon hearing that the plaintiff was re-selling tickets at
above face value, the defendant baseball team refused to sell him sea-
son tickets again. 40 The plaintiff argued that he had a property inter-
est in the ability to continue to purchase the season tickets. 41
However, the court found a more limited interest; specifically, "[e]ach
individual ticket permits the holder to enter the ball park on the date
and at the time stated on the ticket for the specific purpose of attend-
ing the identified game and sitting in the specified sear, subject to all
terms, conditions, and policies established by the baseball club." The
35. Soderholm v. Chicago Nat'I League Ball Club, Inc., 587 N.E.2d 517, 520 (Ill. App. Ct.
1992).
36. Id.
37. 63C AM. JUR. 2o PROPERTY § 1.
38. Soderholm, 587 N.E.2d at 520.
39. See Spitzer Report, supra note 28.
40. Soderholm, 587 N.E.2d at 518.
41. Id. at 519.
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court held that the season tickets were merely licenses and were there-
fore revocable at will of the licensor. 42
2. In re Liebman
In In re Liebman, a bankruptcy court refused to acknowledge a
property interest in the right to renew season tickets to a basketball
club's games. 4 3 The court viewed the season tickets as a series of li-
censes that were nontransferable and revocable. 44 Relying upon
Soderholm, as well as other cases refusing to acknowledge a right to
renewing the season tickets, 45 the court held that the expectation of
the ability to renew is not an interest in property under Illinois law. 4 6
C. The Argument for Finding Property Interests in Licenses
While the commonly recognized rule regarding tickets leans toward
classifying the tickets as a revocable license, some courts find a more
substantial property interest in season tickets. 47 This occurs particu-
larly when the seller posts vague season ticket policies and the seller
fails to enforce its policies consistently. 48
1. Property Interests in Bankruptcy Proceedings
In In re LD. Craig Service Corp., Pittsburgh Steelers Sports, Inc.
objected to the sale of the renewal rights by a trustee during bank-
ruptcy proceedings on grounds that the sale violated the state's anti-
scalping laws.4 9 The court held that the sale of the rights was a prop-
erty interest because there was an expectation of renewal, which had
sufficient value to warrant a sale.50 Similarly, in In re Platt, a trustee
in a bankruptcy proceeding wanted to sell the rights to season tickets
to Boston Red Sox games at an auction.5 ' The court agreed with the
trustee that the season tickets were property because the baseball club
automatically renewed the season tickets and also allowed transfers
42. Id. at 520.
43. In re Liebman, 208 B.R. 38 (1997).
44. Id. at 41.
45. See In re Harrell, 73 F.3d 218, 220 (holding that "although season ticket holders are gener-
ally awarded the opportunity to renew, there is no guarantee that the Suns will extend the offer.
Season ticket holders are powerless to stop the Suns from declining to do so.").
46. In re Liebman, 208 B.R. at 41.
47. Davis, supra note 34, at 248.
48. Id.
49. In re I.D. Craig Service Corp., 138 B.R. 490 (1992).
50. Id. at 502.
51. In re Platt, 292 B.R. 12 (2003).
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regularly, which gives a reasonable expectation that the previous
year's holders could renew the tickets.52
These cases demonstrate a legal trend in bankruptcy courts favoring
the ability of season ticket holders to prevail in establishing property
rights.53 While the team structures the contract as a license, courts
have begun to look beyond the contract terms to the policies of the
teams to find these property rights. 54
2. An Economic Approach to Alienability
From an economic perspective, but still within the context of prop-
erty law, property must be freely alienable in order to promote the
efficient use and allocation of resources. According to the Coase The-
orem,55 if there are gains from trade rational parties will trade, and if
not, not.5 6 From an economic perspective, people who will not make
exchanges that improve their net welfare are irrational.5 7 Under this
framework, free alienability should promote efficiency because ra-
tional actors should trade until the gains from trade no longer out-
weigh the costs of making the transaction.58 This scenario is much
more efficient than a situation in which actors do not trade and are
stuck with whichever resources they are initially assigned.
In applying these concepts to the ticket market, a strong argument
may be made for recognizing a property interest in ticket licenses.
These licenses would allow consumers to assign their tickets to other
consumers and maximize the efficiency of resource allocation.
D. Nuisance
Much public opposition to the practice of ticket scalping is
grounded upon principles of nuisance law.59 Although nuisance is ac-
tually a tort, for the purposes of this discussion it suffices to say that it
also falls within the realm of property law. Politicians and other indi-
viduals that are hostile to the secondary market for tickets often rouse
anti-scalping sentiments by declaring that the practice is a public nui-
sance.60 However, given that the secondary market also has positive
52. Id. at 17.
53. Davis, supra note 34, at 248.
54. Id.
55. The Coase Theorem is a fundamental principle of law and economics.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAw 52 (7th ed. 2007).
57. Id.
58. See Id.
59. See generally Spitzer Report, supra note 28.
60. Id.
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effects on the public, it becomes necessary to our analysis to deter-
mine whether it legally constitutes a public nuisance in the first place.
1. Public Nuisance
A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right com-
mon to the general public, including activities injurious to the health,
safety, morals or comfort of the public.61 In other words, labeling an
activity a public nuisance requires two elements: (1) that there be a
"right common to the general public," and (2) that there be an "un-
reasonable interference" with that right.
With respect to the first prong, if a scalper is aggressive, he could
clearly have an annoying effect on those around him. Furthermore,
scalpers might take up space in an already crowded area. In an at-
tempt to sell their tickets, they block pathways and inconvenience pa-
trons of the event, and others who merely want to go about their
business. If scalpers obstruct the use of public roads or sidewalks, it
could negatively affect the interests of the community at large from
exercising the right to use them, and therefore fall under public nui-
sance.62 The right of the general public to be comfortable, although
its expectation may be diminished in an already-crowded area sur-
rounding a sporting event, seems to be a legitimate interest of the
public.
The question then hinges upon the second prong-whether the
scalpers' interference with that right is unreasonable. Circumstances
that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is
unreasonable include (1) whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public comfort or the public convenience; (2)
whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or adminis-
trative regulation; or (3) whether the conduct is of a continuing nature
or has produced a permanent or long-lasting effect, and, as the actor
knows or has reason to know, has a significant effect upon the public
right.63 Scalpers might cause public inconvenience but that inconve-
nience is hardly significant. Absent aggressive conduct on the part of
the scalper, they do not take up any more space than anyone else.
However, the unreasonableness of the conduct is established in many
61. EDWARD H. RABIN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 545 (2006).
62. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B, comment g ("It is not, however, neces-
sary that the entire community be affected by a public nuisance, so long as the nuisance will
interfere with those who come in contact with it in the exercise of a public right or it otherwise
affects the interests of the community at large. The obstruction of a public highway is a public
nuisance, although no one is travelling upon the highway or wishes to travel on it at the time.").
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821B(2)(a)-(c).
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places by statute, thereby bringing the pro-scalping argument to an
abrupt halt.6 4 Moreover, scalpers tend to regularly engage in the con-
duct and so it is probable that they know of the illegality of their
actions.
Scalping interferes with a right of the general public, and that inter-
ference is unreasonable. Therefore, scalping presents a genuine legal
issue of public nuisance.
2. Statutory Aim
Anti-scalping statutes and ordinances present further evidence that
the issue of nuisance is a legitimate concern of society and is one of
the main policy considerations. 65 Some statutes do nothing more than
restrict the locations where tickets are allowed to be resold.66 Legisla-
tures passing statutes like this are indicating that they are willing to
acquiesce to the aforementioned negative economic effects of the sec-
ondary ticket market, but unwilling to acquiesce to the real problem,
which comes from the unreasonable interferences with the general
right of the public to convenience. 67 Other statutes decline from indi-
cating any intention to giving the ban on the resale of tickets extrater-
ritorial effect,68 which could bolster the argument that the public
nuisance is the true evil that the statutes intend to prohibit.
64. Statutes such as 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 375/1(a) (2005) proscribe scalping activities and
therefore scalping would qualify as "unreasonable" under Restatement 2d of Torts,
§ 821B(2)(a)-(c).
65. See Arlotta v. Bradley Center, 349 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 2003) (arguing that local govern-
ments perceive that the presence of scalpers surrounding the site of an event is an annoyance
and can be, in some instances, even dangerous).
66. See Dreyer & Schwartz, supra note 17 (certain states restrict where the tickets may be
resold).
67. See People v. Shepherd, 74 Cal. App. 3d 334, 383 (Cal. App. 2d 1977) (noting that the
subject and purpose of CAL. PENAL CODE 346, which prohibits ticket scalping, is not to regulate
ticket sales as such, but to limit business activities on public property dedicated to recreational
use. Furthermore, the unregulated use of that area by peddlers of tickets or other property
would add to congestion, annoyance, and inconvenience in areas where crowds must be moved
rapidly and safely).
68. See Connecticut v. Cardwell, 718 A.2d 954, 963 (Conn. 1998) (holding that the statute




Technology has decreased the nuisance effect of the secondary mar-
ket for tickets.69 Indeed, such "street scalpers" are now the smallest
part of an immense ticket resale industry. 70
This is because much of the reselling that used to be done on side-
walks and street corners now goes on over the Internet.7 1 Thus, much
of the secondary market exists in cyberspace rather than in the physi-
cal realm around the venue.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
If "the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is
superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and
not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both ap-
ply." 72 If a statute or an ordinance is contrary to the constitution,
courts have the ability to void the unconstitutional statutes or ordi-
nances through the process of judicial review. 73 Historically, chal-
lenges to the constitutionality of anti-scalping statutes have been
rejected by a majority of courts. This section will explore possible
constitutional challenges to anti-scalping statutes on First Amendment
and substantive due process grounds.
A. First Amendment
A relatively new approach to challenging the constitutionality of
anti-scalping ordinances lies in First Amendment jurisprudence. Laws
that illegalize the solicitation of ticket sales may unconstitutionally re-
strict commercial speech. The Supreme Court has held that "even
speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction is
protected by the First Amendment." 74 Notably, the Court has rea-
soned that "commercial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products and services. Thus, com-
mercial speech performs an indispensable role in the allocation of re-
sources in a free enterprise system."75 However, laws restricting
69. See Glantz, supra note 19, at 262 ("Associating the term "ticket scalping" with the tradi-




72. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803).
73. See Id.
74. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 421 (1993); See also Edenfield
v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 765-66 (1993) ("[Ijt is clear that . . . personal solicitation is commercial
expression to which the protections of the First Amendment apply.").
75. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. at 421 (1993).
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commercial speech, unlike laws burdening other forms of protected
expression, need only be tailored in a reasonable manner to serve a
substantial state interest in order to survive First Amendment
scrutiny. 76
For commercial speech to come within the First Amendment it must
meet the requirements set out in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Commissioner of New York: it must (1) concern law-
ful activity and not be misleading;77 and (2) the asserted governmental
interest must be substantial.78 If both inquiries yield positive answers,
we must determine whether the regulation itself directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest. 79
1. Carroll v. City of Detroit
In Carroll v. City of Detroit, plaintiff ticket sellers brought a class
action suit against the City of Detroit under § 1983, challenging the
constitutionality of an anti-scalping ordinance.80 Although Michigan
generally prohibited the sale of tickets at a price above face value, the
sale of tickets at face value or below was legal as a matter of state law.
The ordinance prohibited sales of and offers to sell tickets, regardless
of price. Accordingly, the court held that the ordinance restricted
speech that concerned lawful activity; and the first element of the
Central Hudson test was met.
Although the City argued that the ordinance was "necessary for the
preservation of the public peace, health, safety, and welfare of the
people of the City of Detroit,""' the court was unconvinced that this
broad, generic statement of purpose assisted in determining the City's
76. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767 (1993).




80. See City of Detroit Ordinance § 5-1-3 (The constitutionality of an original version of the
ordinance and its amended version were both challenged. The amended version provided as
follows: "(a) No person shall stand, or remain, on private property without written permission
from the owner, or his or her designee, for the purpose of selling, or offering for sale, any ticket
of admission to an athletic event, a concert, a public entertainment, a show, or a theater. (b) No
person shall sell, or offer for sale, any ticket of admission to an athletic event, a concert, a public
entertainment, a show, or a theater on any public street, alley, sidewalk or other public place
that is within 500 feet of the structure which houses the athletic facility, the concert hall, the
public entertainment facility, or the theater where the ticket will be used, including the civic
center facilities which consist of Cobo Arena, Cobo Center, and the Joe Louis Arena." City of
Detroit Ordinance § 5-1-3).
81. Carroll v. City of Detroit, 410 F. Supp.2d 615, 624 (E.D. Michigan, 2006).
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true purpose in enacting the ordinance.8 2 The City further argued that
the governmental interests of alleviating traffic congestion and in
safety were "self-evident."8 3 However, the City failed to provide evi-
dence that it enacted the ordinance to address traffic or safety con-
cerns.84 Thus, the second element of the Central Hudson test was met,
and was therefore unconstitutional.85
The court went on to say that even "assuming that the City enacted
the . . . ordinance in an attempt to address traffic or safety concerns,
the City cannot meet the next essential element of the Central Hudson
test, that the . . .ordinance 'directly advance the state interest in-
volved.'" 8 6 The court further reasoned that the ordinance would have
unreasonable implications, such as that it would prohibit a person
from offering to sell his extra Lions ticket to a friend at a restaurant in
the City, without written permission from the owner.87 The court held
that "[t]he City offers no explanation how the . . . ordinance, with its
broad reach, directly advances its alleged interest in traffic safety and
security. . . Moreover... the City has provided no evidence that per-
sons attempting to sell tickets in a manner prohibited by the . . . ordi-
nance genuinely cause traffic congestion or security problems."88
B. Substantive Due Process
Anti-scalping ordinances have been attacked on substantive due
process grounds, with mixed results.89 Although opponents of anti-
scalping ordinances have maintained that ticket scalping is an exercise
of free enterprise,90 the Federal Constitution does not guarantee the
unqualified right to free enterprise. 91 An early Supreme Court, in
contrast, held that a state is empowered to fix prices only where the
business or the property involved had become "affected with a public








89. See Mathew Siporin, Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'! League Ball Club, Inc.: Chicago Cubs Ticket
Scalping Scandal and the Relationship Between Separate Corporate Entities Owned by a Common
Parent, 2 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L. J. 723, 724-30 (2004) (discussing in detail how the legality of
ticket scalping evolved in federal courts and in Illinois, with respect to substantive due process).
90. See Ex parte Quarg, 84 P.766 (Cal. 1906) (arguing that the business of reselling tickets at a
profit is no more immoral, or injurious to the public welfare or convenience, than is the sale of
any ordinary article or merchandise at a profit).
91. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 527-28 (1934).
92. Tyson & Brothers v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 430 (1927).
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such a business, the Court concluded that the state's regulation was in
violation of the Due Process Clause.93 The Supreme Court began to
erode the "affected with public interest" standard throughout the
twentieth century. 94 It is now apparent, and the Supreme Court has
recognized, that the regulation of the resale price of sports and en-
tertainment admission tickets is a legitimate state interest. 95
Due process is satisfied if the anti-ticket-scalping statute or ordi-
nance is reasonably related to a proper legislative purpose and pro-
motes the public welfare without discrimination or arbitrariness. 96
Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized a proper
legislative purpose and a promotion of public welfare from anti-scalp-
ing statutes, states are theoretically allowed to apply a higher stan-
dard. Unfortunately for advocates of the secondary market, state
courts have also been hesitant to reject anti-scalping statutes since the
days of Lochner.97
V. ANALYSIS
The secondary market for tickets has both positive and negative ef-
fects. However, in order to determine how to maximize the positive
effects and minimize the negative ones, it is necessary to look at sev-
eral actual policy approaches to this issue and then determine which is
best. This section will compare several different policy approaches to
the secondary market, and run them through the economic, property
law, and constitutional law frameworks that were established in sec-
tions II-IV. The policies and approaches to be considered are (A)
designated areas and only licensed sellers; (B) an official secondary
market operated by the team itself; (C) barring sales at above face
value, subject to certain exceptions; (D) an aggressive anti-scalping
ordinance; and (E) paperless tickets. In the end, it is my position that
an official secondary market operated by the team itself is the best
approach.
93. In Tyson, a New York statute prohibited the resale of tickets at a price in excess of fifty
cents above the price printed on the face of the ticket. Id.
94. For example, in Nebbia the Court stated that "so far as the requirement of due process is
concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restrictions, a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce
that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose."
95. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Gold v. DiCarlo, 380 U.S. 520 (1965).
96. New Jersey Ass'n of Ticket Brokers v. Ticketron, 543 A.2d 997, 1003 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1988).
97. In Lochner v. New York, the Court struck down a maximum hour law for New York
bakers on due process grounds holding that the state's regulation impermissibly interfered with
the bakers' fundamental liberty to contract. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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A. Designated Areas and Only Licensed Sellers
The first policy examined allows for a secondary market, but
designates certain areas and only licensed sellers may legally engage
in the conduct of buying and reselling tickets to sporting and en-
tertainment events. California9 8 has an anti-scalping statute that
could fall under this category. New York also had a statute in place
recently that could have fallen under this category.99
1. Economics
By allowing the primary and secondary markets to coexist, the mar-
ket is able to clear when the original ticket suppliers sell at a price
below that which the market demands. However, none of the nega-
tive economic concerns from the framework above are resolved. For
example, the fairness concerns are just as prevalent under this scheme.
Moreover, while certain economic benefits are realized, other eco-
nomic costs are realized. In particular, by only allowing licensed sell-
ers to resell tickets the government will limit supply, thereby keeping
prices artificially high.100 The resulting monopoly effect could hinder
the ability of the market to effectively allocate tickets in a beneficial
manner.
One positive economic effect of this type of policy would be the
minimization of search costs. 01 In an entirely laissez-faire market,
potential buyers and potential sellers would need to physically find
each other before they could make the transaction, thereby reducing
some of the consumer surplus that could be gained from avoiding the
queues.102 It is questionable whether the economic benefits of the
"designated areas and licensed-only sellers" approach are significant
enough to outweigh its economic costs.
98. CAL. PENAL CODE §346 (West 1999). California prohibits the selling of tickets in excess of
the face-value (plus lawful taxes) "on the grounds of or in the stadium, arena, theater, or other
place where an event for which admission tickets are sold is to be held or is being held," unless
the seller obtains written permission from the owner of the property. Dreyer & Schwartz, supra
note 17, at 757.
99. N.Y. Arts & Cult. Aff. Law §25.08(2) (2005).
100. A general principle of economics is that license requirements limit supply, thereby keep-
ing prices higher than they would be in an unrestricted competitive market. In effect, licensing
provides the holders of the licenses with what economists call a monopoly rent.
101. Search costs are similar in theory to the additional costs of waiting in queues. In other
words, the total cost of the ticket will be the monetary price of the ticket plus the cost of actually
attaining it. For a more complete discussion of time component costs, see Gary Becker, A The-
ory of the Allocation of Time, 75 ECON J. 493-517 (1965).
102. The patron would need to spend significantly less time searching for a seller on the sec-
ondary market than he would have spent waiting in the queue in order to make the premium
above face value of the ticket worthwhile.
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2. Property Law
With respect to property law, a policy of designating areas in which
the secondary market is legal could curb the nuisance effects of scalp-
ing. If scalpers are forced to stay within the confines of a specific area
the interference with the public's right of convenience becomes much
less unreasonable. The mitigation of nuisance effects makes this pol-
icy attractive from a property law perspective.
3. Constitutional Law
Under a policy that delegates specific areas where the secondary
market could operate, an anti-scalping statute could be reasonably re-
lated to a proper legislative interest. The legislative interest would be
traffic and congestion problems associated with the nuisance concerns
of a hands-off approach, as well as the consumer protection motives of
the government. Furthermore, the policy would not be arbitrary or
discriminatory and would therefore survive a due process challenge.
B. An Official Secondary Market Operated By the Team Itself
The second policy considered is an official secondary market oper-
ated by the team itself, or its subsidiary. Many professional sports
teams use the "if you can't beat'em, join'em" model in order to try to
capitalize on the secondary market themselves. 0 3 However, members
of the general public have viewed teams using this policy as scandal-
ous,104 and it has spawned litigation on grounds that the teams are
themselves breaking the anti-scalping laws. 05
1. Economics
The secondary market operated by the team itself would allow the
market to clear, thereby bringing all of the aforementioned positive
economic effects. In addition, this is a very attractive approach be-
cause many of the negative economic effects are curbed by this policy.
Teams would have the ability to take a cut from the transactions on
the secondary market, which they would appreciate since they are the
103. John Seabrook said, "Well, it does seem that sports teams are kind of leading the way.
They really have gone from, you know, if you can't beat [them], join [them]. The Yankees used
to do the same thing. They used to confiscate peoples seasons tickets if they found they have
been resold. And now the Yankees actually have a StubHub window at the new stadium. They,
you know, assist you in reselling tickets. But, you know, most of the sports teams have now, you
know, realized it's, you know, it's let's get a piece of this, lets become part of the secondary
market." The Economics Of Live Music (National Public Radio broadcast Aug. 3, 2009).
104. See Siporin, supra note 89.
105. Cavoto v. Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc., 2006 WL 2291181 (Ill. App. 1 Dist.).
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ones actually producing the "product." Furthermore, teams operating
official secondary markets would eliminate the fraud and corruption
problems because the team would be able to guarantee that the tickets
were legitimate.106
2. Property Law
Although the tickets themselves would still not be freely alienable
under the official secondary market approach, they would be aliena-
ble in the sense that ticket holders could sell to at least one buyer-
the team itself. This approach would still allow for increased effi-
ciency in the allocation of resources, similar to the aforementioned
increase that Richard Posner argued would come with free alienabil-
ity.'07 The negligible difference would be that the team or its subsidi-
ary would act as a broker. Furthermore, with the official secondary
market, nuisance problems could be minimized.
3. Constitutional Law
This policy would not bring up constitutional issues because the
team would not be a state actor. The team should be able to operate
an official secondary market, assuming they could avoid antitrust
issues. 08
C. Barring Sales Above Face Value, With Exceptions
A third policy examined is the government barring sales above face
value, subject to several broad exceptions. Illinois follows this ap-
proach. 0 9 The first exception is that the registered ticket brokers may
sell tickets above face-value provided they engage in the resale of tick-
ets on a regular and ongoing basis from one or more permanent or
fixed locations within the state.1'0 Furthermore, they must maintain
consumer protection measures such as a toll free number specifically
dedicated for consumer complaints and participate in a refund policy,
and they must not engage in selling or attempting to sell tickets while
near the venue unless they own, lease, or have permission to occupy
that property."' Second, tickets may be resold above face value
106. See Siporin supra note 89, at 740 (saying "The Cubs claim their rationale was to provide
consumers a service and protect fans from purchasing illegitimate tickets.").
107. See Posner supra note 56.
108. This article does not discuss antitrust issues. See Siporin, supra ntoe 89, for more legal
issues with this type of policy.
109. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 375/1(a) (2005).
110. Id. § 375/1.5(b).
111. Id.
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through registered Internet auctions that meet consumer protection
standards.l 12 Third, tickets may be sold above their face value by not-
for-profit organizations for charitable purposes. 13 Fourth, tickets
may be sold above their face value if resale is made through an In-
ternet website whose operator has a business presence and physical
street address in Illinois.114
1. Economics
The economic effects of this policy are similar to the "designated
areas" approach mentioned above. By restricting the free exchange of
tickets, the government might limit supply and therefore keep costs of
tickets high. Furthermore, this type of policy does not address the
fairness concerns of the secondary market. However, by requiring
certain standards for entering the secondary market, the government
furthers its goal of consumer protection. Therefore, this approach
may be slightly more attractive than the "designated areas" approach
from an economic perspective.
2. Property Law
By forbidding ticket suppliers from barring resale above face value
if it falls within one of the exceptions, this policy erodes traditional
property law. Although tickets are traditionally regarded as licenses,
which are non-assignable, this policy forces the property owner to rec-
ognize assignments when they fall into these categories. Assuming
that traditional property law is something that should be preserved,
this policy seems unattractive. However, this almost eradicates the
public nuisance problem because participants in the secondary market
must own, rent, or have permission to use the property from which
they operate. 15
3. Constitutional Law
This would probably pass the Carroll test because the law says noth-
ing about the resale of tickets at below face value. Furthermore, this
policy would not be arbitrary or discriminatory and would therefore
survive a due process challenge.
112. Id. § 375/1.5(c).
113. Id. § 375/1.5(d).
114. Id. § 375/1.5(e).
115. Id. § 375/1.5(b)
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D. An Aggressive Anti-Scalping Ordinance
The fourth policy considered is an aggressive anti-scalping ordi-
nance that bans all transactions on the secondary market. A policy
like this was enacted by the City of Detroit, but was declared uncon-
stitutional in federal court.116
1. Economics
Clearly, anti-scalping ordinances that are this aggressive will not al-
low the market to clear. However, many of the negative economic
effects of scalping could be avoided under a strict policy. Teams could
preserve their goodwill, and price tickets in such a way that would
allow them to maintain a sustainable fan base. From an economic
standpoint, the problem with such a strict policy is that it is difficult to
enforce. Scalping is a reality of market forces, and it is likely that a
law is not enough to stop the emergence of a secondary market.
2. Property Law
From a property law perspective, a strict policy is the best way to
enforce traditional concepts of non-assignability. Nuisance effects
would also be minimal, provided that such a strict policy is
enforceable.
3. Constitutional Law
In Carroll, a strict anti-scalping law was struck on grounds that it
was an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech. It is likely
that other courts would follow similar reasoning and hold aggressive
scalping laws unconstitutional. It is not so clear that courts would
hold these laws as a violation of due process, as the test for due pro-
cess involves a lower level of judicial scrutiny.'" 7
E. Paperless Tickets
The final policy examined is the new system of paperless tickets.
Some entertainers have utilized new technology to eliminate the need
for paper tickets, thereby eliminating the possibility of scalping
entirely." 8
116. Carroll v. City of Detroit, 410 F. Supp.2d 615, 624 (E.D. Michigan, 2006).
117. Id.
118. Jon Bream & Paul Walsh, Miley Takes On Scalpers; E-tickets for Minneapolis Gig May
Keep Prices Down But Add a Hurdle, STAR TRIBUNE, June 4, 2009. Paperless ticket policies
require the showing of the credit card that was used to purchase the ticket.
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1. Economics
When there is no possibility of resale, the market will not clear if
the original supplier sets the price either too low or too high. How-
ever, this policy could prevent consumers from being charged exorbi-
tant prices; therefore it would probably be seen as being fairer.
However, paperless ticket schemes are criticized on grounds that they
create difficulties with entering the venue because every credit card
must be checked at the door.119
2. Property Law
Paperless ticket schemes promote traditional concepts of non-as-
signability and also minimize nuisance effects of the secondary mar-
ket. Therefore, the major property law concerns are avoided by a
paperless ticket policy.
3. Constitutional Law
Typically a paperless ticket scheme would not come from a law, but
from ticket suppliers themselves, and their concerns about scalping.
However, even a law requiring paperless ticket schemes might pass
constitutional muster. Such a law would likely be insulated from any
type of first amendment attack, and could probably pass rational re-
view scrutiny from a due process attack.
VI. CONCLUSION
A team entering the secondary market themselves is probably the
best approach that can satisfy economic, property law, and constitu-
tional concerns. The practice of ticket scalping is virtually impossible
to completely prohibit. Furthermore, its economic benefits might sug-
gest that efforts to prohibit the activity would be better-placed else-
where. The teams themselves are best protected against the negative
effects of scalping by entering into the secondary market themselves.
119. Id.
